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This paper studies the effects of labor-regulation reform 
using data for 10,396 firms from 14 Latin American 
countries. Firms are asked both how many permanent 
workers they would have hired and how many they 
would have terminated if labor regulations were made 
more flexible. I find that making labor regulations more 
flexible would lead to an average net increase of 2.08 
percent in total employment. Firms with fewer than 20 
employees would benefit the most, with average gains 
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in net employment of 4.27 percent. Countries with 
more regulated labor markets would experience larger 
gains in total employment. These larger gains in total 
employment, however, would be achieved through higher 
rates of hiring and higher rates of termination. These 
results may explain why there is substantial opposition to 
labor reforms despite the predicted gains in efficiency and 
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The challenge of labor market policy is to devise a framework for contracting between employers and
w o r k e r st h a ti sa to n c ee ﬃcient and fair. Most people would agree that excessively rigid labor market
regulations prevent the labor market from operating eﬃciently. The resulting losses to employment and
productivity therefore reduce opportunities for workers to ﬁnd good jobs. Most people would also agree
that some regulation is necessary to codify and protect basic standards of fair treatment for workers.
Regulations may also introduce a degree of predictability to, and reduce the cost of, contracting between
employers and workers. The debate over the design of labor market policy centers on the question of
how much and what kind of regulation is necessary to eﬃciently achieve these goals—and when regulation
becomes "excessive".
There is considerable evidence that rigid labor regulations may prevent labor markets from operating
eﬃciently. Botero, et. al. (2004), for example, ﬁnd that countries with heavier labor-market regulations
have lower rates of labor-market participation and higher levels of unemployment. Besley and Burgess
(2004) ﬁnd that "pro-worker" labor reforms in India negatively aﬀected employment and productivity
and increased poverty. Amin (2008) also shows that labor regulation in India has substantial and negative
eﬀects on employment. Heckman and Pagés (2000) ﬁnd that job security legislation in Latin America
reduces employment and increases inequality. Almeida and Carneiro (2008) ﬁnd that increased enforce-
ment of labor regulations constrains ﬁrm size and reduces employment. Ahsan and Pagés (2008) ﬁnd
that employment protection reduces output and employment in the formal sector without beneﬁtting
workers. Kugler (2004) ﬁnds that a reduction in ﬁring costs in Colombia reduced unemployment. A more
complete review of the literature on the eﬀects of labor regulations in developing countries can be found
in Djankov and Ramalho (2008).1
There is also evidence that labor market regulations aﬀect the labor market in ways that cannot
be captured by aggregate employment statistics. Saavedra and Torero (2004), for example, ﬁnd that
increases in ﬁring costs reduce labor demand. Although they could not observe worker ﬂows, they did
ﬁnd that a reduction of ﬁring costs in Peru led to a decrease in mean tenure of workers. Kugler (2004)
1See Heckman and Pagés (2004) for an inﬂuential collection of 11 studies of the eﬀects of labor regulations in Latin
America.
1ﬁnds similar results. Bosch et. al. (2007) ﬁnd that reduced labor market ﬂexibility in Brazil led to an
increase in informality, primarily due to a reduction in the job ﬁnding rate in the formal sector.
A burgeoning literature also shows that labor-market regulations aﬀect the way jobs are distributed
across ﬁrms. Caballero, et. al. (2006), Gonzaga (2003), Haltiwanger, et. al. (2006), and Micco and Pagés
(2007) all ﬁnd that labor-market rigidities reduce the reallocation of jobs across ﬁrms. That is, labor-
market rigidities cut oﬀ the constant churning of workers and jobs across ﬁrms that would otherwise occur
naturally in a free market. Blanchard and Portugal (2001) arrive at a similar conclusion by comparing
job creation and destruction rates in the U.S. and Portugal. They attribute the lower rates of job creation
and destruction observed in Portugal to its employment-protection laws.
The papers mentioned above interpret the evidence that labor regulations reduce the pace of labor-
market reallocations as evidence that labor regulations are impediments to productivity since they prevent
workers from being allocated to the ﬁrms where they are most productive. One could, however, interpret
the results of these papers as evidence that a substantial fraction of workers might be hurt by making
labor regulations less rigid. The reallocation of jobs across ﬁrms generates losses for the workers who lose
their jobs. A well-designed labor-market reform should take into account the short-term losses of workers
who would likely be displaced from their jobs if labor markets are made more ﬂexible. In fact, papers
like Jacobson, et. al. (1993) suggest that, even in countries with ﬂexible labor markets like the U.S., the
negative eﬀects of being a displaced worker may be permanent.
This paper makes two contributions to the literature on labor regulations in developing countries.
The ﬁrst contribution is to use a diﬀerent methodology to conﬁrm previous results in the literature that
rigid labor regulations reduce aggregate employment. In particular, I exploit a unique data set that asks
ﬁrms how many permanent workers would have been hired and ﬁred in the previous ﬁscal year in absence
of rigid labor regulations. Indeed I conﬁrm that, on average, aggregate employment across 14 Latin
American countries would increase by about two percent if labor regulations were made more ﬂexible.
The second contribution, which relates these aggregate gains in employment to the changes in the
hiring and ﬁring of individual workers, is the main contribution of the paper. I ﬁnd that countries that
would gain most by making labor regulations more ﬂexible in terms of aggregate employment, which tend
to be those countries with more heavily regulated labor markets, would exhibit particularly large increases
in worker dismissals. These particularly large increases in worker dismissals would be accompanied by
2even bigger increases in worker hires. Nevertheless, one may interpret these ﬁndings as saying that more
heavily regulated labor markets have more people who would be hurt by the adoption of pro-market
reforms.
A concrete example may make the above point clearer. Using an index of labor market rigidity that
comes from the Economic Freedom of the World report issued by the Fraser Institute, Chile has the most
ﬂexible labor market among the 14 countries studied while Argentina has the least ﬂexible labor market.
Firms in Chile report that, if labor regulations were made more ﬂexible, the net gain to employment
would be 0.76% while Argentinian ﬁrms report a net gain of 2.82% of total employment. This ﬁnding
should not be surprising given the extensive literature that shows that making labor regulations more
ﬂexible generates gains to employment.
The focus of the current paper, however, is how these gains in net employment are accomplished.
Chilean ﬁrms report that the additional dismissals that would result from making labor regulations more
ﬂexible would be 0.94% of total employment, while Argentinian ﬁrms report an additional dismissal ﬁgure
of 2.34%. We therefore see that, despite the fact that Argentina would gain more in terms of aggregate
employment by reforming its more rigid labor regulations, Argentina would also see a higher percentage
of its workers losing their jobs. The larger net employment gains in Argentina arise because their higher
dismissal ﬁgures are more than compensated for by even higher ﬁgures for additional hires.2
The outline of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 brieﬂy reviews the literature on worker
and job reallocations and places the current paper into this broader literature. Section 3 describes the
essential features of the data set used in the paper and documents the manner in which all variables are
calculated. Section 4 presents the main empirical results. Section 5 presents evidence that some of the
results from section 4 can be attributed to changing the status of temporary workers to permanent ones,
but that the main conclusions of the paper hold even when ﬁrms that employ temporary workers are
excluded from the analysis. Section 6 concludes.
2Speciﬁcally, Chilean ﬁrms report that making labor regulations more ﬂexible would result in additional hires as a
percentage of employment of 1.70% while Argentinian ﬁrms report a ﬁgure of 5.15%. Details on these calculations are
presented in the data and methodology section.
32 Related Literature
The literature on worker and job reallocations has achieved considerable importance in recent years. The
essential insight of the early papers such as Davis and Haltiwanger (1990 and 1992) is that aggregate
statistics such as total employment, which may not vary much over time, mask considerable activity at
the micro level. Even when aggregate employment does not change from one year to the next, one can
observe individual ﬁrms being born or expanding dramatically at the same time when other ﬁrms are
exiting the market or contracting dramatically.
In the parlance of the literature, we say that a ﬁrm creates jobs when the ﬁrm’s employment in
the current year is greater than in the prior year. We say that the ﬁrm has destroyed jobs when ﬁrm
employment in the current year is lower than in the previous year. The key early insight of this literature
is that an economy exhibits substantial rates of job creation and job destruction simultaneously. That is,
even when aggregate employment is neither expanding nor contracting, an economy is always reallocating
jobs at a rapid rate.
Hamermesh et. al. (1996) point out that reallocations measured in Davis and Haltiwanger (1990 and
1992) are only a part of total labor reallocations. In data sets like those used by Davis and Haltiwanger,
in which one only observes the total number of employees at the ﬁrm, one cannot measure the total
number of people who have entered the ﬁrm in the past year nor the total number of people who have
left. Hamermesh et. al. deﬁne total worker ﬂows to be the sum of people who have been hired since
the prior year plus the number of people who have separated from the ﬁrm within the past year. They
show that job creation and destruction, as deﬁned by Davis and Haltiwanger, account for less than half
of total worker ﬂows.
The contributions mentioned above have changed dramatically the way we view labor markets. Even
when aggregate employment is not changing, some ﬁrms are growing at the same time when others are
shrinking. Even when ﬁrm employment is not growing or shrinking, employee turnover is still high.
B ye x p l o i t i n gad a t as e ti nw h i c hﬁrms are asked how many workers they would have hired and
terminated in absence of rigid labor regulations, I examine the relationship between labor regulations
and these ﬂows. The eﬀects of rigid labor regulations on net employment growth, which are studied in
the current paper and have been studied extensively in the previous literature, play a central role in the
4policy debate over labor reforms. The eﬀects of rigid labor regulations on worker ﬂows (hires and ﬁres),
which is the novelty of the current paper, is also of crucial importance both for understanding the eﬀects
of the reforms and for understanding why pro-market labor reforms are often met with such opposition.
This paper is the ﬁrst that analyzes directly the eﬀects of labor-market regulations on worker ﬂows in
Latin America.3 Indeed, the descriptive statistics show that making labor regulations more ﬂexible would
have a larger impact on worker ﬂo w st h a no nj o bﬂows. Since opposition to labor reforms likely stems
from individuals who are afraid of being displaced, the focus on worker ﬂows may be particularly relevant
for policy. An individual worker fearing dismissal as a result of a labor reform would likely oppose the
reform even if his or her ﬁrm would increase its total employment as a result of the reform.
Although I do not examine productivity in this paper, it is important to stress that these reallocations
have clear productivity eﬀects. Krizan et. al. (2006) ﬁnd that, for the U.S. retail industry, virtually all
of the labor productivity growth in the retail trade sector is accounted for by more productive entering
establishments displacing much less productive exiting establishments. Autor et. al. (2007) ﬁnd that
employment protection laws have negatively aﬀected productivity in the U.S. Foster et. al. (forthcoming)
show that exiting plants are less productive than incumbent plants and that entering plants are more
productive. Eslava et. al. (2005) show that the factor-market frictions in Colombia that restrict the
reallocations of inputs substantially aﬀect aggregate productivity. Bartelsman et. al. (2004) study data
from 24 countries and conﬁrm the importance of these reallocations in explaining aggregate productivity.
3D a t a a n d M e t h o d o l o g y
This paper uses data from 14 Latin American countries. The 14 countries are Argentina, Bolivia, Chile,
Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru,
and Uruguay. The data can be accessed at www.enterprisesurveys.org. These countries were chosen for
two reasons. First, the enterprise surveys data sets for these countries have weights that can be used
to make the statistics representative of the population of non-agricultural and non-ﬁnancial sector ﬁrms.
Second, the surveys applied to these 14 countries contain the main questions that will be used to generate
all job- and worker-ﬂow statistics used in the paper.
3Almeida and Carneiro (2008) study hires and ﬁres separately, but their strongest results are for aggregate employment.
They also study the enforcement of regulations rather than the regulations themselves.
5All ﬁrms were asked "In ﬁscal year 2005, would this establishment have hired or ﬁred permanent
workers had it not been for having to comply with labor regulations?" When a ﬁrm answered yes to this
question, the ﬁrm was asked speciﬁcally how many workers would have been hired or ﬁred. I also observe
the number of full-time permanent employees who were employed in the last ﬁscal year.
Table 1 presents some basic information about the ﬁrm-level data. In total, 10,396 ﬁrms were used in
the analysis. Observations per country ranged from 436 in Honduras to 1,478 in Mexico. Statistics are
weighted to give estimates of the population of all ﬁrms with at least ﬁve employees not in agriculture
or the ﬁnancial sector. Perhaps the most striking feature is that 83.2% of ﬁrms state that neither hiring
nor ﬁring decisions were aﬀected by rigid labor regulations. The large informal economies in these
countries may explain why so many ﬁrms say that their hiring and ﬁring decisions are unaﬀected by
labor regulations, since ﬁrms may be able to substitute informal workers for formal ones thereby avoiding
the regulatory costs. According to the calculations presented in Schneider (2007), the informal economy
contributes an average of 44% to total GDP for the 14 countries studied here. Another possibility, which
I will explore later in the paper, is that ﬁrms can substitute temporary workers for permanent workers.
Only 2.2% of ﬁrms said that rigid labor regulations aﬀected their dismissal decisions but not their
hiring decisions while 6.6% of ﬁrms said that rigid labor regulations aﬀected their hiring decisions but
not their dismissal decisions. Interestingly, 8.0% of ﬁrms said that rigid labor regulations aﬀected both
their hiring and their dismissal decisions. We will see later that, despite the fact that small percentages
of ﬁrms state that rigid labor regulations aﬀected their hiring or ﬁring decisions, rigid labor regulations
do have an important eﬀect on aggregate employment.
The next step in the analysis is to calculate the job- and worker-ﬂo w ss t a t i s t i c sa tt h el e v e lo ft h e
country. In order to explain this procedure, I begin by deﬁning some terms. Let the subscript c denote
the country and let the subscript j denote the ﬁrm. Speciﬁcally, consider the following deﬁnitions:
emplcj = the number of full-time permanent employees in the last full ﬁscal year t for ﬁrm j in
country c.
hirecj = the number of permanent employees that ﬁrm j in country c would have hired in ﬁscal
year t in absence of rigid labor regulations.
6firecj = the number of permanent employees that ﬁrm j in country c would have let go in ﬁscal
year t in absence of rigid labor regulations.
] emplcj = emplcj + hirecj − firecj.
createcj =m a x ( 0 ,hire cj − firecj).
destroycj =m a x ( 0 ,fire cj − hirecj).
The term ] emplcj is the number of full-time permanent employees that ﬁrm j in country c would have
employed in absence of rigid labor regulations. The job creation ﬁgure for the ﬁrm, createcj,o n l yt a k e s
on non-negative values. In the case that the ﬁrm would not have increased the number of permanent
full-time employees in the absence of rigid labor regulations, this job creation ﬁgure is zero. In the event
that the ﬁrm would have increased the total number of permanent full-time employees in absence of rigid
labor regulations, we say that the increase in the number of employees is the number of jobs that would
have been created. The term destroycj measures the number of jobs that would have been destroyed in
absence of rigid labor regulations. It is analogous to createcj, but deals with decreases in the number of
permanent full-time employees that would have occurred in absence of rigid labor regulations.
In order to gain some intuition about what these statistics measure, consider the following example.
Suppose that, in absence of rigid labor regulations, ﬁrm A would have hired one employee and ﬁred
zero employees. Suppose further that ﬁrm B would have hired 100 employees and ﬁred 99 employees.
For both ﬁrms A and B, it would be recorded that they would have created one job if labor regulations
did not exist. Obviously their values for the number of workers that would have been hired and ﬁred
are dramatically diﬀerent. We therefore see from this example that the number of jobs that would be
created by making labor regulations more ﬂexible and the number of people who would be hired might
be substantially diﬀerent things. An analogous example would show that the number of jobs destroyed
and the number of people ﬁred might be quite diﬀerent as well.
Now that the relevant statistics have been deﬁned at the ﬁrm level, I turn to how I aggregate up to the
level of the country. If I had access to a census of ﬁrms, aggregation would be a simple matter of summing
across all ﬁrms. Since diﬀerent ﬁrms had diﬀerent ex-ante probabilities of entering the sample, some ﬁrms
"represent" more ﬁrms than do others. Now deﬁne wcj to be the inverse of the ex-ante probability that
7ﬁrm j in country c would appear in the sample. A simple interpretation for wcj is that it tells us the
number of ﬁrms that are represented by ﬁrm j.
The ﬁrst and most basic statistic is the net percentage increase in total employment that would have
been achieved by making labor regulations more ﬂexible. The formula is
net_percc = 100 ∗
⎛
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The numerator of the formula should be straightforward. It is simply the amount (measured by number
of permanent workers) that total employment would have increased if labor regulations had been more
ﬂexible. It is standard in the literature to deﬁne the denominator as the average of the two total
employment observations.4
The next statistic measures how much job creation would have been achieved if labor regulations were
made more ﬂexible. Recall that job creation can occur even if making labor regulations more ﬂexible
would have reduced aggregate employment in the economy. The formula is:
create_percc = 100 ∗
⎛
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The above statistic on job creation is simply the sum of all increases in ﬁrm-level employment expressed
as a percentage of total employment. We can deﬁne the analogous job destruction statistic as follows:
destroy_percc = 100 ∗
⎛
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,
which is simply the sum of all decreases in ﬁrm-level employment expressed as a percentage of total
employment. It is useful to note that
net_percc = create_percc − destroy_percc,
that is, we can express the net percentage change in employment as the percent of jobs created minus
the percent of jobs destroyed.
4This practice ensures that a country that expands employment by 15% and then contracts by 15% returns to the exact
same number of employees.
8As mentioned earlier, the statistics on jobs that would have been created and jobs that would have
been destroyed in absence of rigid labor regulations ignore within-ﬁrm worker turnover. We therefore
deﬁne the additional hires that would have occurred as a percentage of total employment as
hire_percc = 100 ∗
⎛
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and the additional ﬁres that would have occurred as a percentage of total employment as
fire_percc = 100 ∗
⎛
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Recall that the net percentage change in employment could be decomposed into its job creation and
job destruction components. Similarly, we can decompose the net percentage change in employment into
its hiring and ﬁring components as follows
net_percc = hire_percc − fire_percc.
I tm a ya l s ob eu s e f u lt on o t et h a t
hire_percc ≥ create_percc and fire_percc ≥ destroy_percc.
I will present some of the results separately by industry and by ﬁrm size. These calculations are
straightforward. For example, if one would like to calculate the above statistics only for the manufacturing
sector, one simply needs to exclude all non-manufacturing ﬁrms from the data set and proceed as described
above.
I will also make use of an indicator of labor market rigidity. I use the index from the The Economic
Freedom of the World (EFW) report published by the Fraser Institute. The index is a function of six
indicators: a measure of the importance of minimum wages, the legally mandated cost of hiring, the legally
mandated cost of worker dismissal, ﬁrm perceptions of the importance of hiring and ﬁring regulations,
ﬁrm perceptions on the importance of collective bargaining, and an index of the importance of military
conscription. I standardize the index, setting the mean to be zero and the standard deviation to be one
for the 14 countries used in the analysis. I then multiply by minus one so that high values of the index
now correspond to more rigid labor markets.
94 Empirical Results
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the data set aggregated at the country level. All statistics
are based on 14 observations: one for each of the countries used in the analysis. Each country receives
equal weight in all analyses in the paper. Table 2 also presents the statistics separately for manufacturing
and non-manufacturing ﬁrms as well as separately for small ﬁrms (those with at least ﬁve employees but
less than 20), medium-sized ﬁrms (those with at least 20 employees but less than 100), and large ﬁrms
(those with 100 or more employees).
We see that, on average, aggregate employment of permanent employees would increase by 2.08 percent
if labor regulations were made more ﬂexible. This increase would be accomplished by 2.59 percent in
additional job creation oﬀset by 0.51 percent in additional job destruction. Using a more inclusive measure
of worker reallocations, we can show that the 2.08 percent increase in aggregate employment would be
accomplished through 3.64 percent additional hires oﬀset by 1.56 percent additional dismissals. The
results are fairly similar in the manufacturing sector and the non-manufacturing sector.
There are, however, important diﬀerences across size categories. The net employment change of
permanent workers that would occur if labor regulations were made more ﬂexible would be 4.24% for
small ﬁrms, 2.85% for medium-sized ﬁrms, and 1.27% for large ﬁrms. Despite the fact that smaller
ﬁrms would beneﬁt the most in terms of net employment growth if labor regulations were made more
ﬂexible, smaller ﬁrms would also experience more employee dismissals. Additional dismissals due to
labor regulations becoming more ﬂexible would amount to 2.55% of total employment for small ﬁrms,
1.96% for medium-sized ﬁrms, and 1.30% for large ﬁrms. In this sense we can conclude that rigid labor
regulations have a larger eﬀect on small ﬁrms both in terms of net employment growth and in terms of
worker turnover. These results are consistent with the results of Pierre and Scarpetta (2004) who ﬁnd
that small ﬁrms are least likely to say that labor regulations are no obstacle to their operation.
Table 3 explores the cross country relationship between worker turnover and gains in net employment if
labor regulations were made more ﬂexible. Speciﬁcally, I take two measures of employment contractions,
additional dismissals as a percentage of employment and additional jobs destroyed as a percentage of
employment, and regress these measures against the percent change in net (or aggregate) employment if
labor regulations were made more ﬂexible.
10Using all ﬁrms, we see that for each percentage point increase in net employment that would result
from the labor regulations being more ﬂexible, dismissals as a percentage of employment would increase
by 0.45 percentage points and that this result is signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level. This result implies that for
each percentage point increase in net employment, additional hires as a percentage of employment would
increase by 1.45 percentage points. The raw data underlying this estimation are plotted in ﬁgure 1.
There are two additional noteworthy observations on the results from table 3. The ﬁrst observation
is to note that the analogous estimations done separately for manufacturing or non-manufacturing ﬁrms
and the estimations done separately by size categories all yield positive coeﬃcients, although not all of
them are signiﬁcant. It is worth mentioning, however, that these disaggregated regressions do not pick up
reallocations across broad sectors or across size categories that would arise in response to labor reform.
It is for this reason that the coeﬃcient of 0.45 from the aggregate regression is larger than any of the
coeﬃcients from the disaggregated models.
The second observation is to note that there are insigniﬁcant results using job destruction as the
dependent variable. That is, the relationship between net growth and worker ﬂows is stronger than the
relationship between net growth and job ﬂows. This result demonstrates that labor reform has important
eﬀects on worker turnover that are not being captured in papers that only study job ﬂows such as
Caballero, et. al. (2006), Haltiwanger, et. al. (2006), and Micco and Pagés (2007).
In light of the previous literature on the eﬀects of labor reforms, one might conjecture that the
countries that could gain the most by reforming their markets in terms of net employment growth would
be those with heavily regulated labor markets. The results from table 3 would therefore suggest that the
particularly high gains in terms of net employment that could be obtained by labor reforms in highly
regulated countries would be accompanied by the displacement of particularly large fractions of their
workforces. I address this possibility in table 4.
Table 4 studies the relationship between an indicator of labor-market ﬂexibility and the job- and
worker-ﬂows statistics used in the paper. The top panel of table 4 presents the results from OLS models.
The independent variable is always the standardized value (multiplied by minus one) of the labor ﬂexibility
indicator from the EFW report as described in the data section. Larger values for the indicator imply
that the labor market is more rigid. When the net percent change in employment from making labor
11regulations more ﬂexible is the dependent variable, we see that countries with more rigid labor markets
would experience larger percentage gains in net employment due to pro-market labor reforms.
But how would countries with more rigid labor market obtain these larger percentage gains in net
employment? We see that additional ﬁres as a percentage of total employment would be larger in countries
that currently have more rigid labor regulations. These larger values for additional ﬁres, however, would
be more than oﬀset by even larger values for additional hires. Once again the picture emerges that the
countries with very rigid labor regulations would observe large gains in net employment and large increases
in worker turnover if they made their labor regulations more ﬂexible. The results using additional jobs
created and destroyed yield similar conclusions although the positive coeﬃcient in the job destruction
equation is not signiﬁcant. I plot the raw data behind these OLS regressions in ﬁgures 2-6.
The bottom panel of table 4 presents the results of Spearman rank-order correlation models as a
robustness check. These models can be helpful if a small number of outliers is driving the OLS results.
Indeed ﬁgure 4 shows that Bolivia has an extremely large ﬁgure for job destruction that may confound
the OLS models. Rank-order correlation models only take into account the rankings of the variables and
not their actual values. The correlation coeﬃcients are all positive and estimated to be 0.6 or higher.
Furthermore, they are all statistically signiﬁcant at least at the 0.05 level. In this sense the rank-order
correlation results are even stronger than the OLS results.
5 Temporary Workers
Recall that the main employment variables used in the paper refer to permanent workers. One therefore
wonders the extent to which the eﬀects documented in the previous section are the result of ﬁrms switching
from temporary to permanent workers once rigid labor regulations are lifted. Unfortunately, ﬁrms are
not asked whether the increased hires of permanent workers would be truly new employees or if the
newly-hired permanent workers would come from their current pool of temporary workers.
Firms are, however, asked how many temporary or seasonal workers were employed in the 2005 ﬁscal
year. Using this information, the average share of temporary or seasonal workers in total employment
is calculated to be 10.6%, ranging from a low of 4.3% in Mexico to a high of 18.3% in Bolivia. Suppose
that the post-reform increases in the number of permanent workers documented in the previous section
12disproportionately come from ﬁrms with high shares of temporary workers. It would therefore seem likely
these gains are not really gains in employment but rather changes in status from temporary to permanent.
Iu s et h eﬁrm-level data to investigate this possibility. I calculate all of the job- and worker-ﬂows
variables described in the data and methodology section at the ﬁrm level. Within each country, each
ﬁrm’s weight in the regressions is proportional to the inverse of its ex-ante probability of being in the
sample multiplied by the average of its current number of permanent employees and the number of
permanent employees it would have if labor regulations were made more ﬂexible. Across countries I set
the sum of the weights equal to each other, that is, I give each country equal weight in the regressions.
This weighting scheme is chosen to make these ﬁrm-level regressions exactly analogous to the country-level
regressions from table 4. I present these results in table 5.
The ﬁrst column of table 5 presents the regressions of the ﬁve measures of job and worker ﬂows used in
table 4 against the standardized value (multiplied by minus one) of the labor-market ﬂexibility indicator
from the EFW report. The construction of the weights guarantees that the estimated coeﬃcients be
identical to those in table 4. The standard errors tend to be somewhat smaller than those reported
in table 4, which is caused by the fact that I am using a country-level indicator in a ﬁrm-level data
set. Although the standard errors are clustered at the country level, Bertrand et. al. (2004) warn that
standard errors tend to be too small when the number of clusters is small. For this reason the results
using the indicator of labor-market ﬂexibility from table 5 need to be interpreted with some caution,
although the main results will later be conﬁrmed in models with one observation per country.
The second column of table 5 reports the results of regressing the job- and worker-ﬂows variables
against the percent of the ﬁrm’s workforce that is temporary or seasonal. The results show that, for each
percentage point increase in temporary workers as a percent of employment, the net gain in permanent
employment from making labor regulations more ﬂexible rises by 0.13 percentage points.5 Not surpris-
ingly, the variable “temporary workers as a percentage of employment” has no eﬀect in the job destruction
model and has a statistically signiﬁcant but small eﬀect in the ﬁre equation. The fact that the creation
of permanent jobs and the hiring of permanent workers in response to labor reform disproportionately
5Since this independent variable is calculated at the ﬁrm level, there is no clear reason to cluster the standard errors in
this regression. Indeed the standard errors are nearly identical when the clustering procedure is dropped.
13come from ﬁrms that employ large shares of temporary workers lends credence to the hypothesis that
some of the new permanent workers would be workers who currently have temporary jobs.
The third column of table 5 presents the results of including the indicator of labor-market ﬂexibility
and the percent of the ﬁrm’s workforce that is temporary or seasonal together in the same equation.
The interesting fact from these models is that the coeﬃcients are nearly identical to those in the ﬁrst
two columns, which occurs because the two variables are essentially uncorrelated.6 The fourth column
adds an interaction term (the indicator of labor-market ﬂexibility multiplied by the percent of the ﬁrm’s
workforce that is temporary or seasonal) to the models from column three.
Two interesting results emerge from including the interaction term. First, the interaction term’s
positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcients in the equations for net growth, permanent job creation, and the
hiring of permanent workers imply that the eﬀects of labor reform disproportionately work through ﬁrms
that currently rely heavily on temporary workers. It therefore appears that some of the eﬀects of labor
reform that were estimated in table 4 pick up ﬁrms changing the status of their temporary employees.
To understand the second result, note that the coeﬃcient of the labor market indicator can now be
interpreted as the eﬀect that making regulations more ﬂexible has on ﬁrms with no temporary employ-
ees. This eﬀect in the net growth model is estimated to be positive but miniscule in magnitude and not
statistically signiﬁcant. The other conclusions from table 4, however, remain qualitatively unchanged
although the magnitudes decrease somewhat. In particular, even for ﬁrms that currently have no tem-
porary workers, making labor markets more ﬂexible will yield larger increases in both hires and ﬁres in
countries that currently have more rigid labor markets.
As I mentioned earlier, there are statistical problems with these ﬁrm-level regressions. To address
these concerns, I once again calculate country-level aggregates of all job- and worker-ﬂow variables as
described in the methodology section. This time, however, I exclude ﬁrms that have any temporary
workers. In this way we can be sure that the results will be unaﬀected by ﬁrms who may change the
status of their temporary workers. On average, employment in ﬁrms that do not use temporary workers
accounts for 45.3% of total employment, ranging from a low of 27.5% in Bolivia to a high of 80.1% in
Mexico.
6A regression of one against the other yields a negative and insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient.
14Table 6 uses the country-level data set described above to re-estimate all of the models from table 4.
The most noteworthy diﬀerence from the results in table 4 is that, although the net gains of making labor
markets more ﬂexible are still estimated to be larger for countries that currently have more rigid labor
regulations, this coeﬃcient is no longer statistically signiﬁcant. The results from table 6 on creation,
destruction, hiring, and ﬁring, are qualitatively the same as in table 4. We therefore conclude that
changes in the status of temporary workers do not drive the main results of the paper.
In summary, the results from tables 5 and 6 suggest that some of the eﬀects of labor reform reported
in table 4 may involve re-classifying workers from temporary to permanent. The result that making labor
regulations more ﬂexible will lead to larger increases in net employment in countries that currently have
more rigid regulations appears somewhat more likely to be driven by these changes in status. Nevertheless
there is no evidence that pro-market labor reforms would have a detrimental eﬀect on net employment.
The result that countries with more rigid labor regulations would experience larger increases both in hires
and in ﬁres is quite robust to excluding ﬁrms that employ temporary workers.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
I ﬁnd that labor-market reforms that make regulations more ﬂexible will likely lead to an increase in
aggregate employment, at least for permanent employees. Given the vast empirical literature on the
eﬀects of rigid labor regulations on employment, the results on net employment changes from the current
paper can be viewed as yet another conﬁrmation of the ﬁndings of a well-established literature.
The novelty of this paper is to study how net employment increases would be achieved after pro-market
labor reform. I ﬁnd that the post-reform increases in aggregate employment would be associated with
increases in employee dismissals. Naturally, these increased dismissals would be more than compensated
for by the post-reform increases in hires. Although I do not analyze productivity in this paper, it is
logical to conjecture that pro-market labor reforms would lead to productivity gains as workers are more
eﬃciently allocated to ﬁrms.7
The ﬁrst policy implication is that advocates for incumbent workers may be quite rational in opposing
market-based labor reforms despite the gains to aggregate employment and productivity. To the extent
7Recall that the Autor et. al. (2007), Besley and Burgess (2004) found negative aﬀects of labor market regulations on
productivity.
15that unions represent workers who currently have jobs that are protected by the existing rigidities, they
may be representing the best interests of their constituents by opposing these reforms.
The natural next question to ask is whether there is a way to achieve the eﬃciency gains and gains in
aggregate employment that are associated with pro-market labor reforms in a way that is more palatable
to incumbent employees concerned about the losses of their jobs? One may consider an unemployment-
i n s u r a n c es c h e m ea saw a yt oo ﬀer protection to those who are dismissed from their ﬁrms in a way
that would not reduce the eﬃciency of the labor market. In fact, as pointed out by Acemoglu and
Shimer (2000), unemployment insurance may provide social protection in an eﬃciency-enhancing way
since unemployment insurance allows unemployed workers to search longer and therefore ﬁnd jobs for
which they are particularly well suited.
Indeed Chile, the country that is ranked as having the most ﬂexible labor regulations among the 14
countries studied in this paper, has adopted a successful unemployment-insurance system. In this sense
one can say that Chile has obtained labor-market ﬂexibility while securing protection for their workers.
Chile has chosen a way to oﬀer social protection to its workers in a way that does not hinder the eﬃcient
working of the labor market.
This paper reinforces a literature that oﬀers considerable empirical support to the hypothesis that
pro-market labor reforms increase aggregate employment. This paper also, however, demonstrates in a
clear way that these labor reforms will likely displace some workers despite the aggregate gains. A reform
package that takes into account the welfare of these displaced workers may have a better chance of being
approved.
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Figure 2: The Effect of Labor Regulations on Aggregate Employment and the 
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 Figure 3: The Effect of Labor Regulations on Job Creation and the Employment Rigidity 
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Figure 4: The Effect of Labor Regulations on Job Destruction and the Employment 
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 Figure 5: The Effect of Labor Regulations on Hires and the Employment Rigidity Index 
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Figure 6: The Effect of Labor Regulations on Fires and the Employment Rigidity Index 
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.coef 0.45 ** 0.10 0.20 -0.07
(0.19) (0.08) (0.16) (0.06)
R
2 0.33 0.11
coef 0.39 * 0.00 0.37 ** 0.05
(0.21) (0.06) (0.16) (0.05)
R
2 0.21 0.00 0.31 0.37
coef 0.32 * 0.09 0.13 0.02
(0.18) (0.10) (0.21) (0.11)
R
2 0.21 0.059 0.03 0.00
% jobs destroyed if 
regs eliminated
All firms Small Firms
% additional fires if 
regs eliminated
% jobs destroyed if 
regs eliminated
% additional fires if 
regs eliminated
% jobs destroyed if 
regs eliminated
% additional fires if 
regs eliminated
% jobs destroyed if 
regs eliminated
Non-Manufacturing
Table 3: Coefficients from job rotation regressions
(independent variable is always % change in total empl if regs eliminated)
Large Firms
% additional fires if 
regs eliminated
% jobs destroyed if 
regs eliminated
% additional fires if 
regs eliminated
% additional fires if 
regs eliminated
% jobs destroyed if 
regs eliminated
Medium-Sized Firms Manufacturing
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Statistics based on 14 Latin-American countries for 
which Enterprise Surveys exist. Each country is given equal weight in the regressions. Firm-
level weights are used in the calculation of country-level statistics to approximate the values 
that would be obtained by using all firms (or all firms in the category). See text for details 
including the formulas for each statistic. We use the notation of ** to denote significance at the 
0.05 level. Similarly * denotes significance at the 0.10 level.econ freedom index for 2005 0.91 ** 1.04 ** 0.13 1.69 ** 0.78 **
(0.40) (0.45) (0.14) (0.58) (0.30)
R
2 0.30 0.31 0.07 0.41 0.36
0.60 ** 0.66 ** 0.64 ** 0.69 *** 0.81 ***
additional 
fires as % of 
empl
Dependent Variable
Table 4: Job Rotation and Rigidity of Labor Regulations                                        
OLS Regressions










hires as % of 
empl














hires as % of 
empl
additional 
fires as % of 
empl
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses for OLS models. The dependent variables are calculated from 
the Enterprise Surveys data as described in the text. These dependent variables could be calculated 
for 14 Latin American countries. Each country receives equal weight in the regressions. The data from 
the Economic Freedom index correspond to the year 2005 and come from the 2007 Annual Report 
titled "Economic Freedom of the World" by the Fraser Institute. The data set was downloaded on June 
3, 2008 and was last updated on September 14, 2007. The indicators were standardized and multipled 
by minus one so that a larger value implies a more rigid labor market. We use the notation of *** to 
denote significance at the 0.01 level. Similarly ** denotes significance at the 0.05 level and * denotes 
significance at the 0.10 level.econ freedom index for 2005 0.91 *** 0.89 *** 0.02
(0.28) (0.24) (0.26)





2 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.04
econ freedom index for 2005 1.04 *** 1.01 *** 0.19
(0.33) (0.29) (0.19)





2 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.05
econ freedom index for 2005 0.13 0.13 0.17 *
(0.08) (0.08) (0.10)





2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
econ freedom index for 2005 1.69 *** 1.66 *** 0.80 ***
(0.54) (0.49) (0.23)





2 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.06
econ freedom index for 2005 0.78 ** 0.78 ** 0.78 ***
(0.31) (0.31) (0.24)





2 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01
(econ freedom index) *                            
(temps as % of all workers)
Dep Var: additional hires as % of empl
temporary workers as                              
% of all workers
(econ freedom index) *                            
(temps as % of all workers)
Dep Var: additional jobs destroyed as % of empl
Table 5: Firm-level regressions of job and worker flows
temporary workers as                              
% of all workers
temporary workers as                              
% of all workers
Dep Var: % change in total employment
(econ freedom index) *                            
(temps as % of all workers)
Dep Var: additional jobs created as % of empl
(econ freedom index) *                            
(temps as % of all workers)
(econ freedom index) *                            
(temps as % of all workers)
Dependent Variable: additional fires as % of empl
temporary workers as                              
% of all workers
temporary workers as                              
% of all workers
Notes: N = 10,396. Standard errors in parentheses.  Weights are set such that each country receives 
an equal weight in each regression. Within each country, weights are set to approximate an 
employment-weighted regression using a census of firms. The data from the Economic Freedom index 
correspond to the year 2005 and come from the 2007 Annual Report titled "Economic Freedom of the 
World" by the Fraser Institute. The data set was downloaded on June 3, 2008 and was last updated on 
September 14, 2007. The indicators were standardized and multipled by minus one so that a larger 
value implies a more rigid labor market. We use the notation of *** to denote significance at the 0.01 
level. Similarly ** denotes significance at the 0.05 level and * denotes significance at the 0.10 level.econ freedom index for 2005 0.67 0.91 ** 0.24 1.51 *** 0.83 **
(0.53) (0.35) (0.33) (0.45) (0.35)
R
2 0.12 0.36 0.04 0.48 0.32
0.38 0.55 ** 0.65 ** 0.60 ** 0.73 ***
additional 
fires as % of 
empl
Dependent Variable
Table 6: Job Rotation and Rigidity of Labor Regulations:                                       
(firms with temporary workers are excluded)                                                 
OLS Regressions
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hires as % of 
empl
additional 
fires as % of 
empl
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses for OLS models. The dependent variables are calculated from 
the Enterprise Surveys data as described in the text. These dependent variables could be calculated 
for 14 Latin American countries. Each country receives equal weight in the regressions. The data from 
the Economic Freedom index correspond to the year 2005 and come from the 2007 Annual Report 
titled "Economic Freedom of the World" by the Fraser Institute. The data set was downloaded on June 
3, 2008 and was last updated on September 14, 2007. The indicators were standardized and multipled 
by minus one so that a larger value implies a more rigid labor market. We use the notation of *** to 
denote significance at the 0.01 level. Similarly ** denotes significance at the 0.05 level and * denotes 
significance at the 0.10 level.